The reason the corruption case involving former Taoyuan County deputy commissioner Yeh Shih-wen (葉世文) has caused such alarm is that Yeh was also for a long period in charge of the Construction and Planning Administration. In this position, he passed countless urban planning and renewal projects, as well as land zoning changes for non-urban areas, many of which would have involved forced land expropriation.
Past land expropriation appeals have been mere formalities, mostly for show, so if the Urban Planning Commission has passed a motion, the subsequent land expropriation is practically guaranteed. A case in point is the verdict handed down by the Greater Taichung High Administrative Court on the Dapu Borough (大埔) demolitions in Miaoli County, the appeals for which were cursory at best, taking on average little more than five minutes each to go through.
It has been many years since martial law was lifted, yet the government has not changed in terms of its excessive use of land expropriation. If anything, things have become worse in the past few years. For example, in the period up until late December 2012, the government completed the expropriation of 95 zones, involving about 7,672 hectares.
Since then, zone expropriations have either already been completed or are planned for a considerable amount of land. This includes 1,168 hectares for the Danhai New Town phase-two project, 126 hectares for Taipei Harbor Bali District (八里), 104 hectares in Fuzhou in Banciao District (板橋) and 236 hectares for Station A7 in Linkou District (林口), all in New Taipei City; 3,316 hectares for the “aerotropolis” in Taoyuan County, including 500 hectares to build an overhead track in the county’s Jhongli City; 447 hectares for the Puyu project and 440 hectares in Erchong Pu, both in Hsinchu County; 154 hectares in Dapu; 110 hectares in Cianjhu Borough (前竹), 30 hectares in Jioude Village’s Wurih Township (烏日), 196 hectares in Taiping District (太平) and 251 hectares for the Shueinan Airport, all in Greater Taichung; 184 hectares for the special district for Taiwan High Speed Rail’s Changhua Station in Tianjhong Township (田中) in Changhua County; 83 hectares for the Yongkang Artillery School in Greater Tainan; and 105 hectares in Yilan County’s Wushi Harbor.
The above list is not exhaustive, it includes just those of which I am aware and amounts to 7,450 hectares of expropriated zones. The land taken in that short period is almost equal to the total of all the expropriations that preceded them. Neither does it include the equally shocking scale, which has not been calculated, of other projects, such as the third and fourth phases of the Central Taiwan Science Park expansion project, the relocation underground and to the east of a segment of railway tracks in Greater Tainan and the Changnan Industrial Park near Siluo Bridge. It comes as no surprise that many people have found themselves the victims of forced land expropriation on more than one occasion.
The above cases were all decided in the urban planning preparatory stages, after which these projects quickly morph into orgies of deal-making and bribe-taking between politics and business, various factions and individual government officials. In these circumstances, how can land expropriation be conducted in a legitimate manner?
Government officials are wining and dining and lining their own pockets and it is all done at the expense of the public. The government must put all land expropriation plans on hold and promptly set up a democratic procedure by which citizens can participate in urban planning and land expropriation cases.
Hsu Shih-jung is a professor in National Chengchi University’s land economics department.
Translated by Paul Cooper
2014年6月13日 星期五
2014年6月12日 星期四
土地徵收應全面停止
葉世文收賄案引起極大震撼，由於他過去長期擔任營建署長，通過無以計數的新訂都市計畫、都市計畫變更，及非都市土地使用分區變更案，這些案件有許多皆關聯著土地徵收。由於歷年來的土地徵收審議皆僅做形式審查，沒有實質審查，因此只要是都市計畫委員會通過，後續的土地徵收幾乎皆是照案通過，這從台中高等行政法院針對苗栗大埔案的判決書中，清楚可見。也因只做形式審查，研究指出，土地徵收每案審議時間皆相當短暫，平均只有五分鐘。
我國雖早已解嚴，但政府浮濫徵收的作為卻是完全沒變，近年來更是變本加厲。若以區段徵收為例，截至二○一二年十二月底止，歷年來完成區段徵收地區計九十五區，總面積約七六七二公頃。但二○一二年後，已完成及預計區段徵收的面積包括：淡海新市鎮第二期一一六八公頃、八里台北港一二六公頃、板橋浮洲一○四公頃、林口A7站區二三六公頃、桃園航空城三三一六公頃、桃園中壢鐵路高架化五百公頃、新竹璞玉計畫四四七公頃、新竹二重埔四四○公頃、苗栗大埔一五四公頃、台中烏日前竹一一○公頃、台中烏日九德卅公頃、台中太平一九六公頃、台中水湳機場二五一公頃、彰化田中高鐵特定區一八四公頃、台南永康砲校八十三公頃、宜蘭烏石港一○五公頃等，以上僅是本人所知，就有七四五○公頃，約為歷年總數的九十七％，而這尚且未計算數量一樣驚人的一般徵收，如中科三期、中科四期、台南鐵路地下化東移、西螺大橋旁彰南工業區等，這也難怪許多土地被徵收人皆不是第一次被徵收。
前述土地徵收都是在都市計畫階段就被決定了，而當都市計畫已經完全變質，成為政商利益交換、派系綁樁，及官員收取賄賂的場域時，這樣的土地徵收還有其正當性嗎？官員喝紅酒及收錢的另一面，竟是逼人民走上絕路！我們要求政府應即刻停止所有的土地徵收，並且馬上建制民眾實質參與都市計畫及土地徵收的民主程序。
（作者為政治大學地政學系教授、台灣農村陣線理事長，https://zh-tw.facebook.com/taiwanruralfront）
發表於《自由時報》，2014/06/09。
前營建署長收賄有多嚴重
八德合宜住宅驚爆收賄弊案，多人被收押，據報載，林口A7合宜住宅恐將接續引爆。由於葉世文曾任內政部營建署長，掌管全國都市計劃、區域計劃及國家公園計劃等，雖然土地徵收計劃由地政司負責，但過往在尊重營建署的決議下，地政司僅作形式審查；因此，營建署可謂實質掌控了整個國土計劃體系。
營建署前署長涉嫌收賄是個非常嚴重的問題，這不僅是個人道德操守有瑕疵，更是涉及國土計劃體制的結構性問題，我們要問，是什麼樣的體制讓他得以上下其手？如以林口A7合宜住宅案為例，它必須是在都市計劃及土地徵收計劃皆通過之後，才會進入招標作業，因此，問題恐非僅是在最後階段，而是整個計劃核定程序皆有問題。
應符利益迴避原則
都市計劃及土地徵收皆應以實現公共利益為目的，然而，何謂公共利益？又是由誰來決定？目前作法是由行政官員與專家學者所組成的委員會來專斷。體制內設計了許多委員會，如以內政部都委會為例，委員人數共27位，其中政府機關代表13位，學者專家及熱心公益人士14位，表面上看來政府機關代表並非多數，但實際運作卻是如此。根據「各級都市計劃委員會組織規程」，政府機關代表不能出席時，「得指派代表出席」、並「參與會議發言及表決」，至於其他委員則無此特權，必須「親自出席會議」。由於學者專家未必每次開會都到，因此政府機關代表乃為實質多數，可完全掌控都委會。都市計劃是由中央或地方政府提出，卻是由政府官員自己來審查，這有符合行政程序最基本的利益迴避原則嗎？
再者，學者專家是由首長聘任，試問，它會聘任像我這樣的學者來擔任委員嗎？不會的。我看見許多委員被長久聘任，這一任期結束之後，再予續聘，或是接聘為其他委員會的委員，如續聘為區委會、環評會委員，彼等游走於各個委員會；也有許多位委員是穿梭於中央及地方政府之間，如在台北市或新北市任期結束後，轉換至中央政府續任委員。所以說，委員會中常可以看到熟面孔，而這些熟面孔後來往往是學而優則仕、甚且成為監察委員及考試委員的被提名人。試問，這樣的委員會機制真能夠實現公共利益嗎？葉世文的胃口是否就是這樣被養大的？倘若行政官員又與建商財團立場一致，那人民權益又能確保嗎？為什麼會有那麼多的自救會進行抗爭？
台都市計劃已變質
土地是壟斷性商品，隱藏著龐大利益，可透過政治力予以創造，因此，地方政治菁英過半數以上皆是從事於與土地相關的行業，如建築業，地方的發展也因此受到了以促進土地開發炒作的建商財團及地方派系所掌控，其視土地為一本萬利的投機工具。政府首長、行政官員、地方派系、建商財團與學者專家委員會形成了土地開發炒作聯盟，經由都市計劃及土地徵收機制來進行圈地，拉攏派系，進行綁樁，並收取政治獻金，我國都市計劃已經完全的變質。
葉世文收賄弊案代表的是整個國土計劃體系的嚴重問題。過往威權時代所設計的委員會統治機制恐已不合時宜，它是被用來掩護政商及派系利益；犧牲的，卻是人民在《憲法》上所保障的基本人權。此時此刻，我們應該努力來建構新時代的國土計劃公民治理機制。
政治大學地政學系教授
台灣農村陣線理事長
發表於《蘋果日報》，2014/06/04。
營建署前署長涉嫌收賄是個非常嚴重的問題，這不僅是個人道德操守有瑕疵，更是涉及國土計劃體制的結構性問題，我們要問，是什麼樣的體制讓他得以上下其手？如以林口A7合宜住宅案為例，它必須是在都市計劃及土地徵收計劃皆通過之後，才會進入招標作業，因此，問題恐非僅是在最後階段，而是整個計劃核定程序皆有問題。
應符利益迴避原則
都市計劃及土地徵收皆應以實現公共利益為目的，然而，何謂公共利益？又是由誰來決定？目前作法是由行政官員與專家學者所組成的委員會來專斷。體制內設計了許多委員會，如以內政部都委會為例，委員人數共27位，其中政府機關代表13位，學者專家及熱心公益人士14位，表面上看來政府機關代表並非多數，但實際運作卻是如此。根據「各級都市計劃委員會組織規程」，政府機關代表不能出席時，「得指派代表出席」、並「參與會議發言及表決」，至於其他委員則無此特權，必須「親自出席會議」。由於學者專家未必每次開會都到，因此政府機關代表乃為實質多數，可完全掌控都委會。都市計劃是由中央或地方政府提出，卻是由政府官員自己來審查，這有符合行政程序最基本的利益迴避原則嗎？
再者，學者專家是由首長聘任，試問，它會聘任像我這樣的學者來擔任委員嗎？不會的。我看見許多委員被長久聘任，這一任期結束之後，再予續聘，或是接聘為其他委員會的委員，如續聘為區委會、環評會委員，彼等游走於各個委員會；也有許多位委員是穿梭於中央及地方政府之間，如在台北市或新北市任期結束後，轉換至中央政府續任委員。所以說，委員會中常可以看到熟面孔，而這些熟面孔後來往往是學而優則仕、甚且成為監察委員及考試委員的被提名人。試問，這樣的委員會機制真能夠實現公共利益嗎？葉世文的胃口是否就是這樣被養大的？倘若行政官員又與建商財團立場一致，那人民權益又能確保嗎？為什麼會有那麼多的自救會進行抗爭？
台都市計劃已變質
土地是壟斷性商品，隱藏著龐大利益，可透過政治力予以創造，因此，地方政治菁英過半數以上皆是從事於與土地相關的行業，如建築業，地方的發展也因此受到了以促進土地開發炒作的建商財團及地方派系所掌控，其視土地為一本萬利的投機工具。政府首長、行政官員、地方派系、建商財團與學者專家委員會形成了土地開發炒作聯盟，經由都市計劃及土地徵收機制來進行圈地，拉攏派系，進行綁樁，並收取政治獻金，我國都市計劃已經完全的變質。
葉世文收賄弊案代表的是整個國土計劃體系的嚴重問題。過往威權時代所設計的委員會統治機制恐已不合時宜，它是被用來掩護政商及派系利益；犧牲的，卻是人民在《憲法》上所保障的基本人權。此時此刻，我們應該努力來建構新時代的國土計劃公民治理機制。
政治大學地政學系教授
台灣農村陣線理事長
發表於《蘋果日報》，2014/06/04。
Flawed system a breeding ground
The allegations that former Taoyuan County deputy commissioner Yeh Shih-wen (葉世文) solicited bribes from the Farglory Group, which was seeking to win a bid to build a housing project in the county’s Bade City (八德), has led to many detentions, and there have been reports that the scandal will grow to involve a similar affordable housing development project at the A7 Station of the Mass Rapid Transit line to Taiwan Taoyuan International Airport.
Yeh previously served as head of the Ministry of the Interior’s Construction and Planning Agency, where he was in charge of urban, regional and national park planning at the national level. Although the Department of Land Administration is in charge of land expropriation, it has conducted only nominal investigations out of respect for the decisions of the Construction and Planning Agency. So the agency could be said to be in control of the entire national land planning system.
It is a serious problem that a former agency head is alleged to have been involved in bribery. This is not merely a matter of individual morality, but rather a structural problem involving the national land planning system as a whole. It therefore becomes necessary to ask how the system could allow someone to act in the way Yeh allegedly did.
Take the A7 Station housing development as an example. This project could only be put up for tender after both the urban planning and land expropriation plans were passed. This implies that the problems do not lie just in the final stage of approval, but in throughout the process.
Urban planning and land expropriation should be aimed at meeting the public interest, which raises such questions as what is meant by the public interest and who should decide what it means and how to achieve it?
At present, these things are decided by a variety of committees made up of bureaucrats, academics and other experts. The interior ministry’s Urban Planning Commission, for example, has 27 members, 13 of whom are government representatives and the rest are academics, experts and those with a passion for the public interest. On the surface, it looks as though government representatives are not the majority, but in practice, they are.
According to the Organizational Regulation of Urban Planning Committees at Different Levels (各級都市計畫委員會組織規程), when representatives from government agencies cannot attend a meeting, they may send representatives who are allowed to speak and participate in voting. However, other committee members do not enjoy this privilege and must attend meetings in person. Given that academics and experts will not always be able to attend every meeting, government representatives still constitute a majority and as such, they gain full control of the commission.
Urban planning projects are proposed by the central or local governments, and then reviewed by bureaucrats. How can this be in line with the most basic principles for eliminating conflicts of interest from the administrative procedure?
Furthermore, academics and experts are employed by government leaders. Now, would a government leader choose an academic such as myself to be on a committee? No. Many committee members are employed for a long time, with their terms often extended or by joining other committees. For example, they may move onto a district committee, or an environmental impact assessment committee. There are also many committee members who go back and forth between the central and local governments. When their term is up on a committee in Taipei or New Taipei City, they join a central government committee.
Therefore, familiar faces are often seen in these committees, faces who often become officials themselves and who may even end up being nominated for a position in the Control or the Examination yuans.
What we really have to ask is whether such a committee mechanism is capable of serving the public interest. Is it this kind of mechanism that made Yeh so greedy? Also, if administrative officials have the same stance on issues as construction conglomerates, how can the rights of the public be protected?
Finally, one must also ask why there are so many self-help and protest groups who feel they must take their protests to the streets.
Land is a commodity that lends itself to monopolization. It involves massive interests that can be used to create political power. Therefore, more than half of all local political elites are involved in construction and other land-related industries, and as a result, local development is controlled by construction conglomerates and local factions that see land as a hugely profitable speculative tool.
Government leaders, bureaucrats, local factions, construction conglomerates and committees made up of academics and experts essentially form an alliance for speculating on land development. They use urban planning and land expropriation to carry out enclosure of land, co-opt factions and forge local support using money and connections — a practice known as bangzhuang (綁樁) — while also taking political donations. These factors have completely changed the nature of Taiwan’s urban planning.
Yeh’s alleged bribery is a serious problem for the entire land planning system. The mechanism for ruling through committee that was designed during the authoritarian era is no longer suitable. It is now used to cover up the government and business interests, as well as those of local factions, while sacrificing the public’s basic human rights as guaranteed in the Constitution.
It is time to establish mechanisms that will allow citizens to govern national land use that reflects the times we live in.
Hsu Shih-jung is a professor in the Department of Land Economics at National Chengchi University.
Translated by Drew Cameron
Published in the Taipei Times, 2014/06/11, p.8.
Yeh previously served as head of the Ministry of the Interior’s Construction and Planning Agency, where he was in charge of urban, regional and national park planning at the national level. Although the Department of Land Administration is in charge of land expropriation, it has conducted only nominal investigations out of respect for the decisions of the Construction and Planning Agency. So the agency could be said to be in control of the entire national land planning system.
It is a serious problem that a former agency head is alleged to have been involved in bribery. This is not merely a matter of individual morality, but rather a structural problem involving the national land planning system as a whole. It therefore becomes necessary to ask how the system could allow someone to act in the way Yeh allegedly did.
Take the A7 Station housing development as an example. This project could only be put up for tender after both the urban planning and land expropriation plans were passed. This implies that the problems do not lie just in the final stage of approval, but in throughout the process.
Urban planning and land expropriation should be aimed at meeting the public interest, which raises such questions as what is meant by the public interest and who should decide what it means and how to achieve it?
At present, these things are decided by a variety of committees made up of bureaucrats, academics and other experts. The interior ministry’s Urban Planning Commission, for example, has 27 members, 13 of whom are government representatives and the rest are academics, experts and those with a passion for the public interest. On the surface, it looks as though government representatives are not the majority, but in practice, they are.
According to the Organizational Regulation of Urban Planning Committees at Different Levels (各級都市計畫委員會組織規程), when representatives from government agencies cannot attend a meeting, they may send representatives who are allowed to speak and participate in voting. However, other committee members do not enjoy this privilege and must attend meetings in person. Given that academics and experts will not always be able to attend every meeting, government representatives still constitute a majority and as such, they gain full control of the commission.
Urban planning projects are proposed by the central or local governments, and then reviewed by bureaucrats. How can this be in line with the most basic principles for eliminating conflicts of interest from the administrative procedure?
Furthermore, academics and experts are employed by government leaders. Now, would a government leader choose an academic such as myself to be on a committee? No. Many committee members are employed for a long time, with their terms often extended or by joining other committees. For example, they may move onto a district committee, or an environmental impact assessment committee. There are also many committee members who go back and forth between the central and local governments. When their term is up on a committee in Taipei or New Taipei City, they join a central government committee.
Therefore, familiar faces are often seen in these committees, faces who often become officials themselves and who may even end up being nominated for a position in the Control or the Examination yuans.
What we really have to ask is whether such a committee mechanism is capable of serving the public interest. Is it this kind of mechanism that made Yeh so greedy? Also, if administrative officials have the same stance on issues as construction conglomerates, how can the rights of the public be protected?
Finally, one must also ask why there are so many self-help and protest groups who feel they must take their protests to the streets.
Land is a commodity that lends itself to monopolization. It involves massive interests that can be used to create political power. Therefore, more than half of all local political elites are involved in construction and other land-related industries, and as a result, local development is controlled by construction conglomerates and local factions that see land as a hugely profitable speculative tool.
Government leaders, bureaucrats, local factions, construction conglomerates and committees made up of academics and experts essentially form an alliance for speculating on land development. They use urban planning and land expropriation to carry out enclosure of land, co-opt factions and forge local support using money and connections — a practice known as bangzhuang (綁樁) — while also taking political donations. These factors have completely changed the nature of Taiwan’s urban planning.
Yeh’s alleged bribery is a serious problem for the entire land planning system. The mechanism for ruling through committee that was designed during the authoritarian era is no longer suitable. It is now used to cover up the government and business interests, as well as those of local factions, while sacrificing the public’s basic human rights as guaranteed in the Constitution.
It is time to establish mechanisms that will allow citizens to govern national land use that reflects the times we live in.
Hsu Shih-jung is a professor in the Department of Land Economics at National Chengchi University.
Translated by Drew Cameron
Published in the Taipei Times, 2014/06/11, p.8.
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